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WHAT ROLE SHOULD FOREIGN PRACTICE AND
PRECEDENT PLAY IN THE INTERPRETATION
OF DOMESTIC LAW?
Diarmuid F. O'Scannlain*
Ladies and gentlemen, I am most honored to have the opportu-
nity to speak here in London this evening. As you know from the
introduction, I am a United States Circuit Judge sitting on the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals, having been nominated in 1986 by President
Ronald Reagan and confirmed by the United States Senate. My court,
which is just one level below the Supreme Court, is our largest re-
gional circuit, and it comprises roughly twenty percent of the coun-
try's population. The geographic reach of the Ninth Circuit is vast: it
encompasses the nine Western states, including California, Oregon,
and Hawaii, as well as the Pacific Territories. And while I will strive
this evening to represent my circuit well, I must make explicit that I
speak only for myself as an individual American judge and not for the
court of which I am a member.
I.
It has been a distinct pleasure for me to spend the past few days
in this historic city. For common-law jurists like myself, London is a
place of special significance. It is here-in the courts of King's Bench,
Chancery, and Exchequer-that the fundamental principles of the
* United States Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit. This lecture was delivered on October 11, 2004, at the Institute of Advanced
Legal Studies of the University of London in London, England, while I was Visiting
Scholar at the University of Notre Dame London Law Programme. I would like to
acknowledge the hospitality of Geoffrey Bennett, Director of the London Law
Programme, in making arrangements for this lecture. I would also like to
acknowledge, with thanks, the assistance of Amir Cameron Tayrani, my law clerk, in
preparing these remarks.
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common law evolved centuries ago. This city's hallowed streets were
once traversed by Lord Mansfield, Sir Edward Coke, and Sir William
Blackstone-men whose contributions to the common law have been
studied by generations of American lawyers. My time in London has
thus forcefully reminded me that the United States and Great Britain
will forever be linked by the unbreakable bonds of history and culture.
Indeed, the United States shares a common legal heritage not only
with Great Britain but also with all other countries that trace their
jurisprudential roots to British origins. Truly, we are all part of the
same common-law family.
A.
In light of the bonds that unite the common-law world, it is not
surprising that courts in many such countries-including Australia,
Canada, and New Zealand-frequently invoke the precedent and
practice of other common-law jurisdictions as a source of persuasive
legal authority. This transnational mode of jurisprudence, which
Americans refer to as "comparative constitutionalism,"' is also relied
upon by British courts. In the words of one member of the House of
Lords, foreign law merits consideration in Britain because "[w] hatever
differences there may be between the legal systems of South Africa,
the United States, New Zealand and this country, many of the basic
principles to which they seek to give effect stem from common
roots."2
In preparing for this lecture, I attempted to gain an appreciation
for the manner in which British courts utilize foreign legal authorities.
In so doing, I came across a number of decisions in which the House
of Lords sought guidance from foreign law when addressing a legal
issue of first impression. In the 1993 case of Airedale N.H.S. Trust v.
Bland, for example, the Law Lords looked to American, Canadian,
New Zealand, and South African decisions to resolve whether it is law-
ful for a doctor to discontinue treating a person in a persistent vegeta-
tive state.3 In Regina v. Kearley, a 1992 decision, the Lords were asked
to define the contours of the rule against hearsay evidence, and they
discussed at length a line of relevant cases from New Zealand and Aus-
1 See generally Vicki C. Jackson, Ambivalent Resistance and Comparative Constitution-
alism: Opening Up the Conversation on "Proportionality, "Rights and Federalism, 1 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 583 (1999).
2 Regina v. Horseferry Road Magistrates' Court, Exparte Bennett, [1994] A.C. 42,
67 (H.L. 1994).
3 [1993] A.C. 789 (H.L. 1993).
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tralia.4 A similar mode of comparative analysis can be found in Derby-
shire County Council v. Times Newspapers Ltd.5 In that 1993 decision, the
Lords addressed whether a local government could maintain a libel
action against a newspaper, and, in so doing, engaged in an in-depth
analysis of American and South African decisions.
Because comparativism is a well-established feature of British ju-
risprudence, it may come as something of a surprise to you that-in
sharp contrast to judicial practices throughout much of the common-
law world-it is exceedingly rare for American courts to reference for-
eign precedent. Indeed, between 1990 and 2003, the Supreme Court
of the United States cited modern case law from Britain or Canada in
only twenty-one decisions. 6 By way of comparison, the Canadian Su-
preme Court cited American decisions 230 times in the year 1990
alone! 7 This reluctance to reference foreign legal authorities is not
limited to the U.S. Supreme Court. It is equally rare for judges on my
court to engage in comparativism. Betwee-n 1990 and 2003, a period
during which all thirteen federal courts of appeals together published
several thousand opinions, only forty-three decisions cited modern
British precedent. 8
Even when foreign courts have squarely addressed an issue that
has yet to be resolved in the United States, American judges typically
remain unwilling to expand their analysis beyond domestic sources of
law. In the 1998 decision of United States v. Balsys, for example, the
U.S. Supreme Court was tasked with determining whether a witness
who fears prosecution by a foreign government can invoke the privi-
lege against self-incrimination. 9 The Court made no mention of the
fact that just two years earlier, the Privy Council, reviewing a decision
of the New Zealand Court of Appeal, had addressed the very same
issue in Brannigan v. Davison.10 In concluding that fear of foreign
prosecution is not a valid basis for invoking the privilege, the Privy
Council did exactly what the U.S. Supreme Court chose not to do in
4 [1992] 2 A.C. 228 (H.L. 1992).
5 [1993] A.C. 534 (H.L. 1993).
6 Search of LEXIS, All U.S. Supreme Court Cases Database (Jan. 15, 2003). By
.modem" case law, I am referring to decisions rendered after 1900, a classification
that is necessary to distinguish the Court's infrequent attempts to seek guidance from
contemporary foreign authorities from its abundant references to older common-law
cases, which the Court uses, in the originalism context, to illuminate the Founders'
intentions.
7 Peter McCormick, The Supreme Court of Canada and American Citations
1945-1994: A Statistical Overview, 8 Sup. CT. REv. 2d 527, 534 & fig.1 (1997).
8 Search of LEXIS, U.S. Court of Appeals Cases Database (May 2, 2003).
9 524 U.S. 666 (1998).
10 [1997] A.C. 238 (P.C. 1997).
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Balsys- it surveyed case law from other common-law jurisdictions-in-
cluding the United States-to inform its resolution of the issue.
It is interesting to note that while American courts are generally
unwilling to invoke modern case law from foreign jurisdictions, they do
rely heavily upon eighteenth- and nineteenth-century British decisions
to elucidate the intentions of the men who drafted and ratified the
United States Constitution in the 1780s. Indeed, there are a number
of recent decisions in which the U.S. Supreme Court has undertaken
a thorough analysis of historic common-law sources in an effort to di-
vine the Constitution's original meaning-a practice that contrasts
sharply with the Justices' reluctance to consider modern authorities
from foreign courts."1 This distinction is well illustrated by INS v. St.
Cyr, a 2001 decision in which the Court addressed whether the writ of
habeas corpus is available to compel a government official to exercise
discretion that the official has refused to invoke. 12 The Court made
no mention of whether other common-law jurisdictions consider the
writ to be available under such circumstances. Instead, the Court en-
gaged in a lengthy discussion of the right to habeas corpus as it ex-
isted in 1789. Indeed, Justice John Paul Stevens's majority opinion
cited approximately a dozen English cases, the most recent of which
was decided almost two centuries ago.
13
B.
As I hope the foregoing overview has demonstrated, the limited
utility that American courts derive from foreign precedent is signifi-
cantly at odds with the practice prevalent throughout much of the
common-law world. This fact has not gone unnoticed by legal com-
mentators. A number of highly respected scholars and jurists have
recently issued sharp criticisms of American courts' reluctance to par-
ticipate in the global dialogue taking place among other nations'
courts. These advocates of comparative constitutionalism contend
that by ignoring the decisions of foreign jurisdictions, American
courts are leaving untapped a valuable store of persuasive authority.
In the words of U.S. Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor, "conclusions reached by other countries and by the inter-
11 State courts are likewise willing to consult eighteenth- and nineteenth-century
English decisions when attempting to discern the origins of a common-law doctrine.
See, e.g., Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973) (referencing English cases dat-
ing back to the seventeenth century to elucidate the foundations of the contributory
negligence doctrine).
12 533 U.S. 289 (2001).
13 Id. at 301-03.
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national community should at times constitute persuasive authority in
American courts" because "there is much to learn from other distin-
guishedjurists who have given thought to the same difficult issues that
we face here."14 Justice Stephen Breyer expressed similar sentiments
in a speech before the American Society of International Law. 15 Jus-
tice Breyer delineated five reasons why he believes American courts
should take foreign precedent into consideration, including the grow-
ing number of domestic legal questions that implicate foreign law and
the utility of foreign decisions as points of comparison for American
courts.16
Patricia Wald, a highly respected former United States Circuit
Judge on the District of Columbia Circuit who served for two years as a
judge on the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugosla-
via, has also publicly argued that American courts should be more re-
ceptive to comparative constitutionalism. To quote Judge Wald:
[C]itizens of most countries have common aspirations, a sense of
dignity and worth, and intuitions and feelings about justice. Why
then would we consciously shut the door to American judges on
looking at the law of these countries as it affects the basic human
needs and dilemmas of their people?
17
And interest in this issue has not been limited to American jurists.
Justice Michael Kirby of the High Court of Australia has gone so far as
to warn that the United States is in danger "of becoming something of
a legal backwater" if its courts continue to disregard foreign
precedent. 8
These commentaries encouraging American jurists to embrace
comparative constitutionalism have borne fruit. In two recent, high-
profile decisions, the Supreme Court of the United States has broken
14 Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, Keynote Address, 96 AM. Soc'v INT'L L. PROC. 348,
350 (2002).
15 Justice Stephen Breyer, Keynote Address, 97 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 265
(2003). Justice Ginsburg likewise defended the propriety of comparative constitu-
tional analysis in a recent speech before the American Society of International Law, in
which she made specific reference to this University of London lecture. See Anne E.
Komblut, Justice Ginsburg Backs Value of Foreign Law, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2005, at A1O.
Justice Scalia championed a decidedly different point of view when he addressed
the Society in 2004. SeeJustice Antonin Scalia, Keynote Address: Foreign Legal Authority
in the Federal Courts, 98 AM. Soc'v INT'L L. PROC. 305, 310 (2004) ("If there was any
thought absolutely foreign to the founders of our country, surely it was the notion
that we Americans should be governed the way Europeans are.").
16 Breyer, supra note 15, at 265-67.
17 Hon. Patricia M. Wald, The Use of International Law in the American Adjudicative
Process, 27 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'v 431, 441-42 (2004).
18 Michael Kirby, Think Globally, 4 GREEN BAG 2D 287, 291 (2001).
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sharply with tradition by invoking foreign practice and precedent to
support a controversial holding. In 2002, the Court ruled in Atkins v.
Virginia that it is unconstitutional to impose the death penalty upon
mentally retarded persons.' 9 To bolster the conclusion that such
practice is impermissibly "excessive" under the Eighth Amendment to
the U.S. Constitution, Justice Stevens made reference to the fact that
the execution of the mentally retarded is overwhelmingly condemned
by the world community.
20
And a year later, in Lawrence v. Texas, the Court invalidated a state
statute that made it illegal for persons of the same sex to engage in
certain sexual conduct.21 Justice Anthony Kennedy concluded that
the statute was an unconstitutional deprivation of the "liberty" guaran-
teed to Americans by the Due Process Clause. 22 He supported this
holding by asserting that the right to sexual freedom "has been ac-
cepted as an integral part of human freedom in many other coun-
tries" 23 and by citing to the decision of the European Court of Human
Rights in Dudgeon v. United Kingdom.
2 4
These recent examples of comparative constitutionalism in the
Supreme Court's jurisprudence have drawn harsh responses from ad-
herents to the traditional view that American courts should place ex-
clusive reliance upon domestic sources of law. A resolution has been
introduced in the United States House of Representatives condemn-
ing the Atkins and Lawrence decisions and, as its title states,
[e]xpressing disapproval of the consideration by Justices of the Su-
preme Court of the United States of foreign laws and public opin-
ion in their decisions, urging the end of this practice immediately to
avoid setting a dangerous precedent, and urging all Justices to base
their opinions solely on the merits under the Constitution of the
United States.
2 5
19 536 U.S. 304 (2002); see also Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 1198-200
(2005) (invoking international covenants and foreign practices to support the conclu-
sion that it is unconstitutional to execute persons who were under the age of eighteen
when they committed their crime).
20 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316 n.21.
21 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
22 Id. at 578.
23 Id. at 577.
24 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 54 (1981). For further discussion of the use of
comparative constitutional analysis in Lawrence, see Roger P. Alford, Federal Courts,
International Tribunals, and the Continuum of Deference: A Postscript on Lawrence v. Texas,
44 VA. J. Ir'L L. 913, 915 (2004) ("For the first time in history, a majority of the
Supreme Court has relied on an international tribunal decision to interpret individ-
ual liberties embodied in the U.S. Constitution.").
25 H.R. Res. 468, 108th Cong. (2003).
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And seven United States Senators have introduced a bill known as the
Constitution Restoration Act of 2004, which provides that
[i]n interpreting and applying the Constitution of the United
States, a court of the United States may not rely upon any constitu-
tion, law, administrative rule, Executive order, directive, policy, judi-
cial decision, or any other action of any foreign state or
international organization or agency, other than English constitu-
tional and common law.
26
Although neither the proposed House resolution nor the Consti-
tution Restoration Act has been enacted, the introduction of these
legislative measures forcibly demonstrates the extent to which many
Americans continue to harbor concerns about the use of foreign law
in their courts. Several influential jurists have also strongly rebuked
the comparativist jurisprudence of Atkins and Lawrence. Supreme
Court Justice Antonin Scalia, who is one of the principal judicial op-
ponents of comparative constitutionalism, labeled as "feeble" Justice
Stevens's effort to use foreign practice to support the conclusion that
execution of the mentally retarded is unconstitutional. 27 In his Atkins
dissent, Justice Scalia argued that "the practices of the 'world commu-
nity'" are "irrelevant" to American courts because their "notions of
justice are (thankfully) not always those of our people."28 He
continued:
"We must never forget that it is a Constitution for the United States
of America that we are expounding .... Where there is not first a
settled consensus among our own people, the views of other na-
tions, however enlightened the Justices of this Court may think
them to be, cannot be imposed upon Americans through the
Constitution."
29
J. Harvie Wilkinson, a United States Circuit Judge on the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals-a sister court to mine-has likewise stated
that the "use of international law to resolve social issues of domestic
import runs counter to the democratic accountability and federal
26 S. 2323, 108th Cong.
27 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 347 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
28 Id. at 347-48 (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
29 Id. at 348 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S.
815, 868-69 n.4 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting)). Justice Scalia and Justice Breyer re-
cently debated the "Constitutional Relevance of Foreign Court Decisions" at an event
hosted by the American University Washington College of Law. See Justice Antonin
Scalia &Justice Stephen Breyer, A Conversation on the Relevance of Foreign Law for
American Constitutional Adjudication at American University Washington College of
Law (Jan. 13, 2005), available at http://www.wcl.american.edu/secle/founders/
2005/050113.cfm.
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structure envisioned by our Constitution." 30 In Judge Wilkinson's
view, it is illegitimate for American jurists to rely upon foreign law to
construe the Constitution because their authority to interpret that
document derives exclusively from the American people.3 1 Judge Wil-
kinson's concerns are shared by Professor Roger Alford of Pepperdine
University, who has forcefully warned that "[u] sing global opinions as




As I detailed a few moments ago, I have the highest regard for the
legal traditions of Great Britain and other common-law countries. We
are indeed sprung from common roots, and our citizens hold dear
many of the same rights and freedoms. Nevertheless, I speak to you
this evening in an effort to explain why American courts may have a
sound basis for treating foreign legal authorities with caution. That
reason has absolutely nothing to do with the misguided notions of
cultural superiority and ethnocentrism sometimes mistakenly ascribed
to Americans. Rather, my argument is premised upon the manner in
which the American legal system evolved from its English origins and
upon the intentions of the Founders who framed and ratified the
United States Constitution.
Indeed, the propensity of American courts to eschew foreign
practice and precedent in favor of domestic sources of law is deeply
rooted in my country's legal history. During the colonial and Found-
ing eras-the period between the early 1600s and the early 1800s-
there evolved a norm cautioning Americans not to rely upon foreign
law because their country's political, cultural, and economic condi-
tions were distinct from those prevalent in Europe. Many of the Con-
stitution's Framers shared in this view and consciously sought to
develop an indigenous American legal system tailored to the realities
of American life. This norm continues to inform legal decisionmak-
ing in my country today. And while, in an attempt to explicate this
norm, I will focus for the next few minutes primarily upon the evolu-
tion of the American legal system, the lessons that can be gleaned
from this historical survey may be equally applicable to other
countries.
30 Hon. J. Harvie Wilkinson III, The Use of International Law in Judicial Decisions, 27
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 423, 429 (2004).
31 Id. at 426.
32 Roger P. Alford, Misusing International Sources to Interpret the Constitution, 98 Am.
J. INT'L L. 57, 58 (2004).
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I hope to demonstrate the importance of acknowledging that,
even in this age of globalization and integration, significant distinc-
tions persist between different countries and different cultures. As
the American Founders recognized, each country possesses unique
cultural, political, and economic features. Indeed, I'm sure you will
agree that even the United States and Great Britain, which are linked
by deep bonds of history and culture, are distinct from each other in
important ways. Because of these indelible differences, legal doc-
trines that evolved to meet the needs of one country may not be read-
ily transplantable to other legal systems where social and political
conditions-though superficially similar-in fact may be very differ-
ent. It therefore may be prudent for judges both in the United States
and in other countries to be cautious about engaging in comparative
constitutional analysis.
II.
But let me focus for the moment on the United States, as that is
the legal system with which I am the most familiar. To understand
American jurists' reluctance to engage in comparative constitutional-
ism, it is necessary to trace the evolution of American law during the
colonial and Revolutionary eras. The earliest settlers realized that the
common law that they carried with them to the New World was tai-
lored to the social and economic realities of English life. That legal
system was therefore ill-suited in some respects to the needs of the
sparsely populated and unsophisticated society in which they lived.
The colonists accordingly made the quite conscious decision to aban-
don certain aspects of English law and to begin the process of fashion-
ing a distinctly American jurisprudence. In the words of one scholar,
there was among the early colonists "a very clear perception of their
destiny to work out a new legal system, to establish rules dictated by
their special polity or by the conditions of primitive and simple life in
which they found themselves."
33
Let me provide you with a few examples of how the early Ameri-
can settlers modified English law and crafted a legal system that was
more conducive to life in the New World. The hallmark of the early
jurisprudence of the Massachusetts Bay Colony, for example, was the
Puritan settlers' infusion of religious elements into the law. Because
the common law as it was conceived of in England did not comport
with the Puritans' religious values, they promulgated in 1648 the Book
of the General Lawes and Libertyes, a code that tailored the common law
33 PAUL SAMUEL REINSCH, ENGLISH COMMON LAW IN THE EARLY AMERICAN COLO-
NIES 57 (Leonard W. Levy ed., Da Capo Press 1970) (1899).
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to fit the contours of their faith. The biblically inspired code provided
scriptural citations as authority for many of its proclamations, and it
instituted the death penalty for crimes such as adultery and blas-
phemy, which were only misdemeanors at common law. 34 Similarly,
the leaders of the Massachusetts Bay Colony did away with many of the
procedural formalities of English law, which were inappropriate in
light of the simple social and economic conditions in the colony. The
complex and formalistic pleading requirements of English courts
were relaxed to fit the needs of a colony with few lawyers and little
legal literature. 35
Other changes to the common law were prompted by the fact
that economic conditions in the colonies were much more primitive
than in England. There was, for example, an acute shortage of labor
in the New World. Notwithstanding the harshness of the Puritans'
biblically inspired laws, the number of capital crimes throughout the
colonies actually decreased because able bodies-even those of
criminals-could not be spared to the gallows. 36 Similarly, while la-
borers who fled ajob while under contract in England were subject to
imprisonment, such a transgression was punished by an additional pe-
riod of servitude in the colonies.37 And because American women en-
gaged in a wide range of businesses that in England were open only to
men, colonial laws eased some gender-based legal restrictions. For ex-
ample, women were permitted to bring suit in their own name-a ne-
cessity for doing business.38
Early American lawmakers also altered the common law of prop-
erty so as better to coincide with the realities of colonial life. English
property law had developed in a feudal setting where land was scarce,
and it thus was ill-suited to a country with vast tracts of undeveloped
land and a budding commercial market in real property. Accordingly,
the colonists molded the common law to facilitate the ready aliena-
tion of land, as, for example, by developing a system for the recording
of deeds. 39 Similarly, the colonists restricted the practice of entailing
estates, which precluded the free alienation of inherited land outside
of the family. 4
0
34 PETER CHARLES HOFFER, LAW AND PEOPLE IN COLONIAL AMERICA 22 (rev. ed.
1998).
35 STEPHEN BOTEIN, EARLY AMERICAN LAW AND SOCIETY 35 (1983).
36 KERMIT L. HALL, THE MAGIC MIRROR: LAW IN AMERICAN HISTORY 31 (1989).
37 HOFFER, supra note 34, at 17.
38 HALL, supra note 36, at 36.
39 HOFFER, supra note 34, at 101.
40 RICHARD B. MORRIS, STUDIES IN THE HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 86 (1930).
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These historical developments are relevant to the current debate
about comparative constitutionalism because they represent the ori-
gins of a legal norm suggesting that the unique social, economic, and
political realities of American life require a distinctly American juris-
prudence. Because foreign law may be ill-suited to American condi-
tions, exclusive reliance upon domestic authorities is encouraged.
The evolution of this norm accelerated greatly during the Ameri-
can Revolution and its aftermath, as Americans strove to develop a
jurisprudence that comported with the republican values upon which
the newly independent United States was founded. Many members of
the Founding generation were influenced by Montesquieu's theory,
set forth in The Spirit of the Laws, that the content of a legal system
ought to bear a close relation to the country's political, social, eco-
nomic, religious, and geophysical environment. To quote Montes-
quieu, laws "should be adapted in such a manner to the people for
whom they are made, as to render it very unlikely for those of one
nation to be proper for another.''41 Montesquieu's work was widely
circulated and highly influential during the Founding era, and the
ideas formulated in The Spirit of the Laws therefore helped speed the
development of a legal system that was tailored to the realities of
American life and shorn of foreign elements.
Thomas Jefferson-author of the Declaration of Independence
and third President of the United States-was a firm proponent of
this movement. He read Montesquieu and shared his conception that
the tenor of a legal system must coincide with a nation's social and
cultural persuasion. At the time of the American Revolution, Jeffer-
son helped to introduce over a hundred bills designed to bring Vir-
ginia's laws into alignment with the values of the Revolution.
42 In the
words of one such bill, these reforms were necessary because many of
Virginia's laws were "founded on principles heterogeneous to the re-
publican spirit.., and.., having taken their origin while our ances-
41 CHARLES DE SECONDAT, BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS
104-05 (David Wallace Carrithers ed., Thomas Nugent trans., Univ. of Cal. Press
1977) (1748).
42 See THOMASJEFFERSON, AuTOBIOGRAPHY (1821), reprinted in 1 THE WRITINGS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 1, 57-58 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., New York, G.P. Putnam's Sons
1892).
When I left Congress, in 76. [sic] it was in the persuasion that our whole
code must be reviewed, adapted to our republican form of government, and,
now that we had no negatives of Councils, Governors & Kings to restrain us
from doing right, that it should be corrected, in all it's [sic] parts, with a
single eye to reason, & the good of those for whose government it was
framed.
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tors remained in Britain, are not so well adapted to our present
circumstances of time and place. '43 Notable reforms proposed byjef-
ferson included the abolition of primogeniture. 44 This practice of
awarding an intestate parent's estate exclusively to the eldest son was
disfavored by Americans because it perpetuated an aristocratic class
with vast land holdings. Other reforms proposed by Jefferson in-
cluded the establishment of religious freedom and the institution of a
system of humane criminal sanctions, wherein capital punishment was
to be reserved for murder and treason only.
James Madison-the man often credited with being the "Father
of the United States Constitution"-was instrumental in securing the
enactment of many of Jefferson's proposals. Madison's sympathy for
the notion that the fledgling American republic needed to develop a
legal system that was not unduly reliant upon foreign law is evident in
The Federalist. This highly influential series of essays was a collabora-
tion among Madison, Alexander Hamilton, andJohnJay, and was pro-
duced in an effort to convince the American people to ratify the
Constitution. The work is still frequently cited by the U.S. Supreme
Court to inform its constitutional interpretations. In The Federalist,
Madison wrote that "neither the common nor the statute law of [En-
gland], or of any other nation, ought to be a standard for the pro-
ceedings of this, unless previously made its own by legislative
adoption."45 Madison went on to assert that English law "would be...
[an] illegitimate guide" for the United States to follow. 46
A different approach to mitigating the influence of foreign law
was adopted by the states of New Jersey,47 Kentucky, 48 and Penn-
sylvania, 49 which enacted statutes forbidding the citation of English
precedent in their courts; New Hampshire had a court rule to similar
effect.50 The spirit of these nineteenth-century provisions was very
43 Bill for the Revision of the Laws (Oct. 15, 1776), reprinted in 1 THE PAPERS OF
THOMASJEFFERSON 562 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1950).
44 Bill Directing the Course of Descents (1785), reprinted in 2 THE PAPERS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 391 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1950).
45 THE FEDERALisT No. 42, at 268 (James Madison) (Robert Scigliano ed., 2000).
46 Id.
47 Act Relative to Statutes, N.J. Acts 23d Gen. Assembly (1799), reprinted in ELIZA-
BETH GASPAR BROWN, BRITISH STATUTES IN AMERICAN LAW 1776-1836, at 132 n.52
(1964).
48 Act Prohibiting the Reading of Certain Reports in This Commonwealth,
1807-1808 Ky. Acts 23 (1808), reprinted in ELIZABETH GASPAR BROWN, BRITISH STAT-
UTs IN AMERICAN LAW 1776-1836, at 132 n.52 (1964).
49 1812 Pa. Laws 125 (1810).
50 Ford W. Hall, The Common Law: An Account of Its Reception in the United States, 4
VAND. L. REv. 791, 806 (1951).
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similar to that of the Constitution Restoration Act currently pending
before Congress, which, as I mentioned earlier, would preclude fed-
eral courts from relying upon foreign law when interpreting the
Constitution.
The New Jersey noncitation statute remained on the books for
two decades, and was finally repealed in 1819,51 while its Pennsylvania
counterpart remained in force until 1836.52 As a result of these stat-
utes, lawyers in the young republic found it necessary to seek gui-
dance from the country's own nascent collection of case law, rather
than from the vast store of more readily available English decisions.
Indeed, the developing norm against the citation of foreign pre-
cedent injected a degree of urgency into the task of producing pub-
lished American case reports. When Justice Jesse Root of the
Connecticut Superior Court compiled a collection of the court's deci-
sions in 1798, he wrote in the introduction that a "work of this nature
is doubly important at this time; when we are forming a system of
jurisprudence congenial to the spirit and principles of our govern-
ment. '53 Echoing the sentiments of Jefferson and Madison, Root
urged judges to resort to the decisions of domestic courts so as "to lay
a foundation, to establish a character upon, and to rear a system of
jurisprudence purely American, without any marks of servility to for-
eign powers or states."
54
III.
I hope that this brief historical overview has succeeded in demon-
strating the manner in which colonial- and Founding-era Americans
consciously strove to develop a legal system that was tailored to the
unique conditions of our country at the time. These efforts fostered a
norm cautioning American jurists not to place reliance upon foreign
legal authorities because they may be inapposite to American
conditions.
Of course, the world today is a very different place than it was in
the eighteenth century, and one might wonder whether a norm that
developed at the time of my country's Founding retains relevance to-
day. After all, while the United States may have been a unique experi-
51 ELIZABETH GASPAR BROWN, BRITISH STATUTES IN AMERICAN LAW 1776-1836, at
83 (1964).
52 CHARLES WARREN, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN BAR 233 (Howard Fertig, Inc.
1966) (1911).
53 JESSE ROOT, REPORTS OF CASES ADJUDGED IN THE SUPERIOR COURT AND SUPREME
COURT OF ERRORS FROM JULY A.D. 1789 TO JUNE A.D. 1793, at xliv (Hartford, Hudson
and Goodwin 1798).
54 Id. at xiv.
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ment in democratic governance in 1776, today democracy is
embraced by an ever-growing number of countries. Why shouldn't
American courts attempt to benefit from the legal insights of those
foreign jurisdictions that champion many of the same values held dear
by Americans? I submit that there are two reasons why United States
courts continue to adhere to the Founding-era norm cautioning
against the citation of foreign legal authorities.
First, the intentions of the Constitution's Framers hold a privi-
leged position in American jurisprudence. Although there is certainly
no consensus among American judges as to the appropriate manner
in which to treat the Framers' intentions, there are many jurists who
believe that the original intentions of the Founding generation are
entitled to a significant degree of deference. Because men such as
Madison and Jefferson believed that the United States should develop
a legal system that was tailored to American conditions and that did
not place significant reliance upon foreign sources of law, proponents
of originalism are wary of according weight to foreign precedent. To
do so would contravene the intentions of the Founders.
Beyond the question of original intent, however, there are practi-
cal considerations that militate against the use of comparative consti-
tutionalism, and these considerations are applicable not only to
American courts, but also to those throughout the rest of the world.
As I mentioned earlier, we must not lose sight of the fact that certain
indelible differences-whether cultural, political, or economic-dis-
tinguish the countries of the globe from each other. I, for one, am
thankful that the world is not comprised of homogenous cultures and
peoples, for I believe that our differences should be celebrated. In-
deed, there are many respects in which Great Britain is socially, cultur-
ally, and economically distinct from the rest of the European Union,
and I imagine that many people in this country are today grappling
with how best to preserve these uniquely British qualities as the EU
continues its steady integration-a process, incidentally, that is very
similar to the one by which the thirteen American states formed a
single union more than 200 years ago. The authority of the European
Court of Human Rights, for example, to issue rulings that are binding
upon member nations is analogous in many respects to the role of the
U.S. Supreme Court in the American constitutional scheme. 55
55 See, e.g., Lustig-Prean v. United Kingdom, App. Nos. 3147/96, 32377/96, 29
Eur. H.R. Rep 548 (2000), available at http://www.worldlii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/
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The United States also remains unique from the rest of the world
in several important respects. For example, belief in the so-called
"American Creed" of liberty, equality, individualism, democracy, and
the rule of law largely defines what it means to be an "American."
While other societies certainly share these values, in no other country
are these ideas so central to the national identity. As Samuel Hunting-
ton has written, "in the United States, as in no other society, ideology
and nationality are fused and the disappearance of the former would
mean the end of the latter."56 This value system binds together Amer-
icans of different religious, ethnic, and racial backgrounds and, in
many respects, serves as the cornerstone of our national identity. For
this reason, I question the propriety of Justice Kennedy's reference to
foreign precedent to support Lawrence's holding that it is unconstitu-
tional to proscribe sexual conduct between persons of the same sex.
Such fundamental principles as the sexual mores of the American
people are best expressed by American legislative bodies, and such
cultural questions should therefore be resolved without regard to the
values held by persons in other parts of the world.
The United States is unique in several regrettable respects as well:
for example, the nation has one of the highest violent crime and drug
use rates in the developed world. Because the United States must
grapple with a nearly unparalleled crime problem, the criminal juris-
prudence of other nations may be inapposite to American conditions
and thus an inappropriate guide for American jurists to follow. I
therefore wonder whether it was appropriate for the Supreme Court
to rely upon foreign practice to support its holding in Atkins v. Vir-
ginia that execution of the mentally retarded is unconstitutional.
While I have reservations about the widespread use of compara-
tive constitutional analysis, I acknowledge that limited references to
foreign legal authorities may play a beneficial role in contemporary
Amnerican jurisprudence. Indeed, judges may be able to glean valua-
ble insights from the practice and precedent of foreign jurisdictions
where American conditions are consistent with those prevalent in the
rest of the world or where Congress has expressed a desire to bring
the United States into alignment with the international community.
Let me provide you with a recent example of such a case. In
Eldred v. Ashcroft, a 2003 decision, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld a
statute that retroactively extended the duration of copyrights for
twenty years. 57 In order to establish that the law rested upon an ac-
56 SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, AMERICAN POLITICS: THE PROMISE OF DIsHARMoNY 27
(1981).
57 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
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ceptable rational basis, the Court emphasized that the statute brought
U.S. copyright law into alignment with that of the European Union,
which-like the statute in question-also provides for a term of life
plus seventy years.58 Comparative constitutional analysis was appropri-
ate in Eldred because copyright law is not an area where distinct Amer-
ican cultural or social conditions require a unique response from U.S.
lawmakers. Moreover, Congress had explicitly evidenced a desire to
harmonize American copyright law with that of the European Union.
It is also sensible for American courts to look to foreign sources
of law when exercising admiralty jurisdiction 59 and when construing
treaties and multinational conventions because there is, presumably,
an interest in achieving a uniform interpretation of maritime con-
tracts and international agreements. In El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd. v. Tsui
Yuan Tseng, for example, the Supreme Court addressed whether a pas-
senger could pursue a state law tort claim against an airline for alleged
psychological harm occasioned by an intrusive search.60 The Court
held that such a claim was barred by the Warsaw Convention, and in
reaching that result, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg afforded "considera-
ble weight" to a decision of the British House of Lords that inter-
preted the same document. 61 She also offered citations to decisions
from courts in Canada, New Zealand, and Singapore that had reached
a similar result.62
Likewise, in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, a 2004 decision, a Mexican
citizen brought a tort claim alleging that his rights under interna-
tional law had been violated when he was detained within Mexico by
persons hired by the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency and then trans-
ferred to American officials to stand trial in the United States. 63 The
Supreme Court quite properly made reference to international con-
ventions and treaties as a step in the determination of whether the
plaintiff's detention contravened a norm of customary international
law.
IV.
In conclusion, may I suggest that a cautious approach to compar-
ative constitutionalism may well be the most appropriate methodology
58 Id. at 205-06.
59 See, e.g., Nemeth v. Gen. S.S. Corp., 694 F.2d 609, 612-13 (9th Cir. 1982) (con-
sulting, and ultimately adopting, the House of Lords' position on an issue of admi-
ralty law).
60 525 U.S. 155 (1999).
61 Id. at 175.
62 Id. at 176 n.16.
63 124 S. Ct. 2739 (2004).
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to adopt. Despite the seemingly irresistible forces of globalization cur-
rently at work, our respective countries and legal systems remain dis-
tinct in several important aspects. Judges who disregard these
differences run the risk not only of making bad law, but also of pro-
foundly altering their legal system by incorporating incompatible for-
eign values. As one recent commentator has explained, the
"American Constitution... was framed and amended in light of spe-
cific American history, culture, and aspirations."
64 For the foregoing
reasons, I find myself aligned with those who believe that courts in the
United States should restrict the use of foreign legal authorities to
certain well-defined categories of cases. Of course, each country must
ultimately determine for itself the appropriate role that foreign prac-
tice and precedent should play in its domestic law, which no doubt
means that we will be discussing this subject for a long time to come.
I am grateful for the opportunity to share my perspectives on this
issue with you, and I welcome any questions that you may have.
64 ROBERT H. BORK, COERCING VIRTUE: THE WORLDWIDE RULE OF JUDGES 137
(2003).
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